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For roughly a year during 2015 and 2016, about once a month, my mobile phone would ring 
in the middle of the night. Waken from a deep sleep, without the presence of mind to screen 
the call, my answer would be greeted by a frantic voice shouting at me in French. Not being a 
French speaker (and particularly not in the middle of the night) the only word I would recognise 
LQWKHVHWLUDGHVZDVµDODUP¶(DFKFDOOIROORZHGWKHVDPHIUXVWUDWLQJSDWWHUQRI)UHQFKWLUDGH
on their end, English tirade on mine, then me hanging up. More often than not, another call 
ZRXOGIROORZVKRUWO\DIWHUZKLFK,ZRXOGQ¶WDQVZHUEXWWKHFDOOORJVOLVWHGWKHVHFDOOVDVHLWKHU
originating in France, or numbers tKDWZHUHµXQNQRZQ¶ 
Over the following months, these calls continued periodically, and became 
progressively more annoying to me. I would angrily answer the calls, then, if the number was 
listed, send back Google-translated French language text messages saying not to call this 
number again and that I would call the police. The last call I received was in April 2016, when 
I was at a conference in San Francisco. Again it was a late night call. With all the bravado of 
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someone five and a half thousand miles away from their potential adversary, my end of the 
conversation consisted of a string of exSOHWLYHVIROORZHGE\WKHVWDWHPHQW³'RQRWSKRQHPH
DJDLQIRUWKHODVWWLPH\RXKDYHJRWWKHZURQJQXPEHU´ 
³,GRQ¶WKDYHWKHZURQJQXPEHU9LQFH«´ 
Vince. Not Mr. Miller, Dr. Miller, or even Vincent, but Vince. Suddenly, these first words 
spoken in English in this set of exchanges changed them from something mildly annoying, to 
VRPHWKLQJPRUHVLQLVWHUDQGGLVWXUELQJ+RZGLGWKLVSHUVRQIURPDSODFH,KDYHQ¶WYLVLWHGLQ
years know my name and number? Who do I know in France? What else do they know about 
me? What do they want? I hung up immediately with a heavy feeling in the pit of my stomach. 
This person, this stranger, located somewhere five thousand miles from me, had made me feel 
vulnerable. The calls have seemingly stopped now. But even as I write this in the late Autumn 
of 2016, I still wonder how these people in France got my number, let alone my name, and put 
the two together.  
With a bit of academic reflective hindsight, one interesting thing for me about this set 
of interactions was the speed at which my state of being changed from an arguably hyper-
aggressive stance  enabled by a technology which placed me 3000 miles from my adversary, 
to a somewhat intense experience of vulnerability where that adversary seemingly knew a lot 
more about me than I knew about him. I felt somehow exposed and susceptible to something 
unknown, unexpected, and beyond my control.  
Corporeal existence, some would argue, is defined by a stance of vulnerability and the 
DQWLFLSDWLRQ RI µGDQJHURXV VXUSULVHV¶ 'UH\IXV, 2000,; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). This is the 
understanding that the material world around us is full of potential hazards; that things can 
happen to us. Some of these, such as falling off a nearby cliff, or drowning in a river we are 
crossing, are more evident to us than others. However, part of having a body mean possessing 
3 
 
a background awareness that something, even something unexpected, could happen which we 
need to be ready for. The dangerous surprise could be a falling tree, a wild animal, or a lunatic 
waiting in the bushes, but having to look after a body means, to a certain extent, expecting the 
unexpected, to look for potential immediate threats. 
A world of digital communications and digital presences at a distance complicates this. 
On the one hand, a world of far-reaching, mediated, often anonymous interactions can give us 
the impression of a lack of embodied vulnerability. When people are far away, we can become 
more brave, more willing to defend ourselves and others, become µNH\ERDUGZDUULRUV¶:HFDQ
be more confident, more expressive or our opinions or our creative talents, or more brazen, by 
more actively pursuing flirtatious, romantic or sexual interactions, and even more aggressive 
and abusive, by engaging in acts of trolling, bullying, or other forms of harassment. 
At the same time, our continuous, archived, digital presence, distributed in a multitude 
of networks, archives, databases and servers, opens us up to exposure to others of which, 
because they are not embodied or immediate, we are only partially aware. Indeed, the 
confidence and forthrightness, indeed, sense of invulnerability common to digital interactions 
EHOLHVDKRVWRIXQNQRZQµGDQJHURXVVXUSULVHV¶FUHDWHGWKURXJKDQH[WHQVLRQRIH[SRVXUHERWK
bodily and virtually, to unknown scales. These vulnerabilities become more apparent to us 
when we hear of, or are the victims of, a data breach, hacking scandal or other forms of 
µGDQJHURXVVXUSULVH¶ 
Using the work of Heidegger and other phenomenological, existential theorists, I argue 
that a defining feature of digital being thus consists of a contradictory stance to the world. First, 
a mediated, metaphysical outlook which encourages a stance of invulnerability in online social 
interactions. Such an outlook misapprehends our presence and fails to grasp our ontological 
status as both Dasein (beings in and of the world) and Mitsein (beings with and of each other). 
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Secondly, and paradoxically, an increased, yet less apparent, ontological vulnerability resulting 
from our continual, omnipresent online presence, manifest in constant connection to others and 
the ceaseless archiving of our data, actions and interactions. This means that we are 
increasingly, yet ambiguously, vulnerable to others WKURXJKDFRQWLQXDOµEHLQJZLWK¶ which has 
no time, space, or embodiment. 
Using the examples of the five year trolling of Nicola Brookes, and WKHUHFHQWµ$VKOH\
0DGLVRQKDFN¶WKLVSDSHUZLOOLQYHVWLJDWHWKHQRWLRQRIvulnerability as one way to investigate 
being in the digital age (cf. Lagerkvist 2016). In particular, it will propose that the 
misapprehension of invulnerability online leaYHV XV LQHYLWDEO\ RSHQ WR SHULRGLF µGDQJHURXV




As Harrison (2008) points out, vulnerability is largely unthought of within the social sciences. 
Indeed, vulnerability, when it is discussed, is conceived of as both a weakness and a contingent 
state which needs to be overcome or rectified. Thus, much effort in social science research is 
VSHQWLGHQWLI\LQJµYXOQHUDEOHSHRSOH¶DQGKRZWRSURWHFWWKHPRUFKDQJHWKHLUYXOQHUDEOHVWDWXV
LQDJLYHQVLWXDWLRQ7KLVRIFRXUVHLVFRPSDUHGWRDNLQGRILGHDOVWDWHRIµLQYXOQHUDELOLW\¶RU 
autonomy which arguably refers back to the legacy of Descartes-inspired modern philosophy 
DQGLWVFRQFHSWLRQRIµEHLQJ¶DVDUDWLRQDODXWRQRPRXVVHOI-contained, metaphysical subject 
DFWLYHO\HQJDJHGZLWKWKHµREMHFWLYH¶ZRUOGDURXQGLW+DUULVRQIn such a conception, 
WKHVXEMHFWDVDµPLQG¶RUµSV\FKH¶VWDQGVDSDUWIURPWKHSK\VLFDOZRUOGRIREMHFWVDQGERGLHV
DQGLPSRVHVLWVLQWHQWLRQDOUDWLRQDOµZLOO¶XSRQWKDWZRUOGWKURXJKWKHSRVVHVVLRQRIDERG\
7KLV YLHZ ODEHOOHG YDULRXVO\ µPLQGERG\ GXDOLVP¶ µPHWDSK\VLFDO SUHVHQFLQJ¶ RU
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µHVVHQWLDOLVP¶ ZDV RI FRXUVH IDPRXVO\ FULWLTXHG E\ +HLGHJJHU 0HUOHDX-Ponty, Nietzsche, 
Derrida, Dewey and many others from phenomenological, existential and pragmatic traditions 
throughout the Twentieth Century.  Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Nancy in particular argued 
WKDWµEHLQJ¶DVVXFKQHHGVWREHFRQFHLYHGRILQLQWHU-relation with, not in opposition to, the 
physical and social world in which we find ourselves. It is in such an inter-relation, where our 
being is open to the world and yet constructed in connection with that world, where 
vulnerability can be seen as part of the ontological experience of being human (see Butler 
2004). 
 
Being as existential exposure 
The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others (Heidegger, 1962, p.: 
155 original emphasis). 
$OWKRXJK+HLGHJJHULVODUJHO\JLYHQFUHGLWIRUDVVRFLDWLQJWKHHVVHQWLDOUHODWLRQVKLSRIµEHLQJ-
ZLWK¶ WR µEHLQJ¶ 3\\KWLQHQ  SRLQWV RXW WKDW 6LPPHO  DFWXDOO\ SUHFHGHG
Heidegger in suggesting that being-with-RWKHUVZDVFRQVWLWXWLYHRIµEHLQJ¶ LWVHOI+HTXRWHV
6LPPHOµ7KHKXPDQEHLQJLVLQRQH¶VZKROHHVVHQFHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWRQHOLHVLQ
UHFLSURFDOLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKRWKHUSHRSOH¶6LPPHO, 1992, p.: 15, cited in Pyyhtinen, 2009). For 
6LPPHOHYHQEHLQJµDORQH¶LVDIRUPRIVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQZKLFKLQYRNHVWKHODFNRIDQRWKHU¶V
presence where there has been previous meaningful and influential contact. Thus the being of 
an individual is something always and already constituted by others, thereby making others 
crucial in the structure of being (see also Lagerkvist, 2016). 
Shortly after, in Being and Time+HLGHJJHUDUJXHG WKDW µ%HLQJ-ZLWK¶ 0LWVHLQZDV
part of the ontological existence of Dasein, or µBeing-in-the-world¶. This formed part of his 
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overall critique of metaphysical thinking in which he argued against the notion dominant in 
Western philosophic traditions of a self-enclosed, self-referential view of being as a 
transcendental thinking subject, or res cogitans D µWKLQNLQJ WKLQJ¶. Heidegger argued that 
KXPDQVDUHQRWWKHVHNLQGRIDEVWUDFWHGµWKLQNLQJWKLQJV¶ZKLFKVWDQGDSDUWIURP the world and 
contemplate it. Indeed, to conceive of humanity in this way is WR PLVXQGHUVWDQG µEHLQJ¶
,QVWHDGKHSRVLWHGWKDWKXPDQVDUHµGRLQJWKLQJV¶WKDWH[LVWLQDQGWKURXJKERGLHVZKLFKKDYH
a relationship with the world and the things and beings in it. Selves and the world are thus co-
constructed, and the world, far from a VHULHVRIµREMHFWV¶ to be contemplated from a distance by 
an abstract µVXEMHFW¶ WUDQVFHQGHQWDO µPLQG¶ RU µSV\FKH¶ LV VRPHWKLQJ LQ ZKLFK EHLQJV DUH
thrown, and something in which they dwell in a relationship of openness to, and engagement 
with, the world.  
The ORJLFWKDWDQµLQGLYLGXDO¶VKRXOGQRWEHXQGHUVWRRGDVVRPHWKLQJLQLVRODWLRQIURP
the material world (in terms of ego, psyche etc), also applies to our relationship with other 
Beings in the world. The individual should not be understood in isolation from other Beings 
(Daseins), but as a part of the social world in which we are thrown and with which we 
continually engage (Cohn, 2002,; Heidegger, 1987). The world is something that is shared with 
others in the sense that people (Daseins) exist in these spaces in propinquity; they dwell 
WRJHWKHULQWKHVDPHµ%HLQJ-here¶, not as one subject to another, but as co-dwellers opened up 
unto the world. So µEHLQJ-ZLWK¶ (Mitsein) LV DQ µH[LVWHQWLDO FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI 'DVHLQ¶
(Heidegger, 1962, p. :155).  
When we fail to acknowledge our being as something dependent on others, the meaning 
of being for Heidegger is obscured, but importantly, so is the relationship to the world and the 
others encountered in it (Sorial, 7KHSUREOHPWKHQEHFRPHVRQHRIWKHNLQGVRIµEHLQJ-
ZLWK¶ZHDFKLHYHZLWKRQHDQRWKHU:KHQZHHQFRXUDJHGE\&DUWHVLDQ-esque metaphysical 
thinking) see ourselves as self-HQFORVHGVXEMHFWVRU µ,¶V¶QRW UHDOO\DSDUWRI WKDWZRUOGZH
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become alienated from ourselves, others, and the world. The obscured relationship to others 
that results from terms of their being-ZLWK+HLGHJJHUUHIHUUHGWRDVDµGHILFLHQW¶IRUP
of solicitude, where we engage in a µEHLQJDJDLQVWRUZLWKRXW¶µSDVVLQJE\¶, RUµQRWPDWWHULQJ¶
towards one another (Bauer, 2001, P.: 136,; Cohn, 2002, p.: 37). 
0LWVHLQSURYLGHVDFRQWUDVWZLWKWKHDOLHQDWHGPHWDSK\VLFDOµ,¶ZLWKDUHFRJQLWion of 
fellowship and mutual dependence, but with a tension of potential VXEVXPSWLRQRIRQH¶VXQLTXH
DXWKHQWLFLW\LQWRZKDW+HLGHJJHUFDOOVµGDVPDQ¶µWKHWKH\¶ZKHUHZHFDQORVHRXUVHOYHVLQ
the undifferentiated will of masses, or fail to be recognised as unique beings in our own right 
(Bauer, 2001). 
Recognising this tension, Jean-Luc Nancy (2008) argues that Heidegger never fully 
DUWLFXODWHGWKHµZLWK¶LQµ%HLQJ-ZLWK¶HYHQWKRXJKWKDWKDGEHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGDV essential for 
'DVHLQ¶VH[LVWHQFH1DQF\VTXDUHO\addresses this µVKRUWIDOOLQWKLQNLQJ¶LQ+HLdeJJHU¶V
QRWLRQRIµ%HLQJ-ZLWK¶Ey using +HLGHJJHU¶V being-with ontological status as a springboard to 
GHYHORSKLVQRWLRQRIµ%HLQJ-singular-SOXUDO¶. For Nancy, this is a way of conceptualising the 
complex relationship between unique individual beings and their communal co-construction 
with others (2008,; 2000). 
Nancy (2000) uses this concept to retain the idea that the uniqueness or alterity of each 
bodily being matters, and that each being is unique in terms of their face, voice, gestures, 
comportment, yet at the same time acknowledging that ZKDWLWLVWRµEH¶DVDKXPDn by necessity 
exists as something that is shared, because meaning itself is something that can only come into 
existence through sharing or exposure. According to Willson (2012), the essence of being-
singular-plural is the inevitable and transient exposure to one another. Willson herself suggests 
WKHWHUPVµH[SRVXUHV¶RUµHYHQWV¶DVLQPDQ\ZD\VSUHIHUDEOHWRµEHLQJ¶DVWKH\PRUHDFFXUDWH
GHSLFWV1DQF\¶V FRQFHSWLRQ of what it is to exist in common with others1. It is that mutual 
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exposure to one another which preserves thHH[LVWHQFHRIDQµ,¶LQWKHIDFHRIWKHFRPPRQDOLW\
RIDµZH¶ 7KXVµEHLQJ-ZLWK¶IRU1DQF\LVµWKHH[SRVXUHRIVLQJXODULWLHV¶1DQF\, 1991, p.: 30). 
Emmanuel Levinas also emphasises the fundamentally relational character of human 
existence and the entangled condition of inter-relation with other humans as one of exposure 
and vulnerability. Levinas (1985,; 1969) argued, to be human is to always already find oneself 
connected in relationships with others which we cannot define or control (Groenhout 2004). 
Indeed, it is the intersubjective encounter of the other, an exposure to the other, which, for 
Levinas, is the first and primary human encounter which ultimately constitutes human subjects. 
In this respect, it is our relational existence which makes vulnerability to others an ontological 
part of the human condition. For Levinas, this vulnerability is manifest in terms of a 
fundamental burden of HWKLFDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\7KDWLVH[SRVXUHWRWKH
IDFH
RIWKHRWKHUµFDOOV¶
RUµPDNHVPRUDOGHPDQGV¶RIWKHVXEMHct to acknowledge and care, or to abandon or harm: 
µThere is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me¶ (Levinas, 
1985, p.: 89). 
Indeed, the face of another is something which presses upon us. Where we generally engage 
the presence of, say, rocks or trees or other objects in the world ZLWKDµSDVVLQJ-E\¶WRXVH
+HLGHJJHULDQWHUPLQRORJ\EHFDXVHWKH\GRQRWSUHVHQWµIDFH¶WRXVEy contrast, other humans 
tend to bring us into engagement. We are drawn to them because their uniqueness as other 
persons brings their ultimately unknowable and uncontainable otherness to us. It demonstrates 
to us our limitations, that we share the world, that we are not able to do simply as we please, 
that we are connected. 
 
Being as embodied exposure 
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For Nancy, both the singularity of being and the commonality of meaning centre around the 
body, as it is the traits and capacities of the body which mark us out as singular within the 
proximity of other embodied beings which recognise its meaningful singularity through 
apprehension of a unique body, thereby bringing it into existence. Levinas, refers to the 
embodied, face-to-face encounter as the primary encounter constitutive of human subjectivity. 
The face of the other, on whom our being is dependent and who we are called to responsibility 
for or to care for, is a physical entity with physical and emotional needs (Groenhout, 2004). As 
a result, human existence is not only defined relationally, but is dependent on that embodied 
relation to others.  
To be a human body is to be physically vulnerable, and awareness of such vulnerability 
is part of our ontological condition. Of course, all bodies themselves are vulnerable to the 
physical hazards and threats encountered in the material world as well as the potential hazards 
involved in being in proximal relations with others. For Butler (2004, p.: 29), the vulnerability 
of bodily life is the realisation of vulnerability to a µsudden address from elsewhere¶. As beings 
with bodies, we have a sense of exposure to the unpredictable, the unchosen, and the 
unforeseen. Such a sense is part and parcel of our encounter with others (Harrison 2008). We 
need others to exist, yet this exposes us to them. This understanding of our limits and 
vulnerabilities affords us a certain wariness as we make our way through the world. Indeed, as 
Dreyfus (2000) suggests, the sense of risk, endemic to embodied life, provides us with a sense 
RIWKHµUHDOQHVV¶RIWKHZRUOGDURXQGXV%Rrrowing from Merleau-3RQW\¶VXVHRIurdoxa as a 
NLQGRIµEDFNJURXQGUHDGLQHVV¶LWLVWKLVFRQVWDQWUHDGLQHVVWRZDUGVWKLQJVVXFKDVµGDQJHURXV
VXUSULVHV¶RUDJHQHUDOUHDGLQHVVWRµJHWDJULS¶LQDQ\SDUWLFXODUVLWXDWLRQ2 which helps us make 
sense of the reality of the world.   




vulnerability further by, on the one hand, acknowledging the shared, ontological and existential 
vulnerability of humans as living beings exposed to potential harm, injury and inevitable death, 
and, on the other, by highlighting the fact that while it may be a state shared among all humans, 
the experience of vulnerability is not equal (Page, 2016, p.: 25).  As Butler (2004) suggests, 
vulnerability is a universal condition with an uneven distribution (see also Schwartz in chapter 
three of this volume). 
These scholars emphasise the distinction between universal conditions and particular 
circumstances (Fineman, 2008,; Page, 2016), or similarly the difference between 
µSUHFDULRXVQHVV¶ DQG µSUHFDULW\¶ %XWOHU,  RU EHWZHHQ WKH µSRVVLEOH¶ RU FRQGLWLRQ RI
YXOQHUDELOLW\ DQG WKH µDFWXDO¶ RU H[SHULHQFH RI vulnerability (Gilson 2014). In this way, 
feminist scholars are able to discuss vulnerability as an ontological condition, but also the 
specific political and social contexts in which vulnerable bodies are a site of politics 
(Berghoffen, 2003). This allows them to emphasise the uneven nature of vulnerability for 
women, LGBT persons, and ethnic minorities3.  
 
Online Mitsein, Digital Urdoxa and Dangerous Surprises 
The ontological notion of being as embodied and relational means that vulnerability is not a 
weakness or a condition to be overcome, but is part of the ontological condition of human 
existence (Harrison, 2008,; Lagerkvist, 2016 ,QGHHG YXOQHUDELOLW\ µLV WKH LQKHUHQW DQG
continuous susceptibility of corporeal life to the unchosen DQG XQIRUHVHHQ« LWV LQKHUHQW
RSHQQHVV WRZKDW H[FHHGV LWV DELOLWLHV WR FRQWDLQ DQGDEVRUE¶ +DUULVRQ, 2008, p.: 427). As 
embodied, corporeal beings, we are always left exposed, susceptible to the natural and social 
world of other humans around us to which we are intimately connected, but yet exceed our 
capabilities of control. 
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Through existential connectedness to others, and through having bodies which are open 
to the world and its dangerous surprises, vulnerability is an inherent part of the human 
condition. But what happens online when our social encounters are more numerous and 
interconnected yet separated from our embodiment? 
&OHDUO\WKHQRWLRQRIµEHLQJ-ZLWK¶WDNHVRQDQHZUHOHYDQFHLQGLJLWDOFXOWXUH:LWKD
little thought, the co-construction of self and world becomes more evident when we recognise 
the complex, structureless, interconnecting, indeed rhizomic machinations of our digital 
existence as articulated by writers such as Bernard Stiegler (1998,; 2008) (in terms of, for 
example, the exteriorisation of desire into digital technologies) and Brian Rotman (2008), who 
both conceive of contemporary human being as an assemblage of bodies and technologies 
which include data, profiles, avatars, images, databases which are stored on a vast array of 
networked servers and distributed around the world.  $V5RWPDQVXJJHVWHGµLWLVKDUGHUDQG
KDUGHUWRVD\ZKHUHWKHZRUOGVWRSVDQGWKHSHUVRQEHJLQV¶5RWPDQ, 2008, p.: 8).  
Our being is data-encumbered, and in that sense, conceptually at least, we can imagine the 
collapse of the metaphysical Cartesian self which separates the subject from object. As Coté 
VXJJHVWVµWKHFDSWXULQJRIGDWDLVQRWVRPHWKLQJWKDWKDSSHQVWRXVLWLVFRQVWLWXWLYHRI
RXU EHLQJ DV GLJLWDO KXPDQV¶ &RWp, 2014, p. :14). Our digital selves exist in and through 
relationships with other digital things and beings. A social networking profile, for example, 
cannot be meaningfully conceived of in isolation as an individual, self-FRQWDLQHGµWKLQJ¶JLYHQ
that its existence is dependent on connection and interaction with other profiles, as well as the 
networked databases, image banks, hyperlinks, and even material bodies which are assembled 
into what we perceive as the singularity or continuity of µthe profile¶.  
Mitchel (2014) argues that the spatial technologies of connection and the temporal 
technologies of archiving have created a digital lifeworld of archival subjects, giving the things 
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and beings present online a perpetual ready-to-hand quality in Heideggerian terms, defying 
both space and time. The temporally fleeting contact of the embodied proximal or face-to-face 
interaction in terms of touch, gesture, gaze, conversation, becomes a matter or record in online 
contexts. For example, the timelessness of archival subjects, their actions, and their interactions 
(constituted in the form of both known and unknown presences, such as profiles, databases, 
conversations, search histories, purchase histories, browsing histories and the like) marks out 
a fundamental difference between online and offline in terms of Being or µBeing-with¶. 
Whereas our embodied exposures to others are usually tied to the moment of encounter, a 
moment circumscribed in time and space, our archived presence extends the digital moment of 
encounter to any time or any place. Thus we are always already present to others in the 
networked traces of ourselves. We therefore potentially and unknowingly encounter any other, 
anywhere, all the time.   
Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere (Miller, 2016), one key problem in contemporary 
culture is that the Web, as currently manifest with its distanced, mediated and (largely) 
disembodied interactions, plays into the hands of metaphysical thinking by allowing us 
(through processes of networking and archiving) to achieve a kind of omnipresence in time and 
pace which is beyond the body as we currently understand it. This, I ague encourages a 
metaphysical outlook which is more akin to the self-enclosed, self-referential, and ultimately, 
alienaWHGµWKLQNLQJWKLQJ¶RI'HVFDUWHVres cogitans. 6XFKDQµ,¶ tends to set the world and the 
things and people in it at a distance from itself, and ironically, such an outlook juxtaposes a 
world in which we are increasingly interconnected through technologies. Thus, I suggested that 
digital culture is paradoxically potentially moving us further away from understanding 
ourselves ontologically as interconnected with the world4 (Dasein) and each other (Mitsein), 
and that this misunderstanding or alienation has articulated itself in a series of ethical crisis 
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(such as controversies around abusive behaviour, privacy, speech) which have become endemic 
to the internet.  
 In what follows, I will present two online incidents which demonstrate how this 
misunderstanding of our ontological status manifests itself in terms of a heightened impression 
of invulnerability in online social encounters with others, yet paradoxically led to intense 
experiences of vulnerability to a host of unexpected µGDQJHURXVVXUSULVHV¶ 
 
The trolling of Nicola Brookes ± RUµ+DSS\&KULVWPDVWRDdRJ¶ 
In early November, 2011, a teenage contestant on the popular UK talent show The X-Factor, 
Frankie Cocozza, left the programme amidst allegations of drug use. The X-Factor Facebook 
page soon filled with hostile comments and criticism of Mr. Cocozza. Dismayed by what she 
had seen, a 45 year-old mother from Brighton, UK, decided to intervene with some words of 
HQFRXUDJHPHQW µ.HHS \RXU IULHQGV DQG \RXU IDPLO\ FORVH )UDQNLH 7KH\¶OO PRYH RQ WR
VRPHRQHHOVHVRRQ¶&DUH\, 2012)5. This proved to be both a prophetic and pivotal moment in 
0V%URRNHV¶OLIHDVthis intervention turned the focus of attention onto herself, with personally 
devastating consequences. 
Within hours, over a hundred abusive messages were directed at her on the X-Factor 
page, her own Facebook page had been cloned and was sending abusive and paedophilic 
messages to young women on Facebook in her name. Other fake accounts were set up in both 
KHU DQG KHU GDXJKWHU¶V QDPH ILOOHG ZLWK SKRWRVKRSSHG, sexualised images of them both. 
Websites were created which ZDUQHGWKHSXEOLFRIKHUµIDNH¶EDWWOHZKLFK&URQH¶V disease, as 
well as accusing her of being a drug dealer, prostitute and paedophile. Such claims drew in 
others (under false pretences) to join in the malicious comments and threats, escalating the 
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intensity and scope of harassment, as well as the wider damage to her reputation. Months later, 
her home address was published online, prompting worries about physical threat (she began to 
sleep with a knife under her pillow). She subsequently received µVQDLOPDLO¶KDUDVVPHQWDVZHOO
LQFOXGLQJD&KULVWPDVFDUGIHDWXULQJDSLFWXUHRIDGRJDQGWKHFDSWLRQµ+DSS\&KULVWPDVWRD
GRJ¶,QWKHFDUGWKHUHZDVDSRVW-operative photo of her taken from her daughters Facebook 
page (Naked Security 2013), neatly tying together the relationship between her digital and 
embodied vulnerability.  
,QKHURZQSHUVRQDODQGOHJDODFFRXQWVRIWKHXQIROGLQJHYHQWVLWZDV1LFROD%URRNHV¶
GHVLUHWRµDQVZHUEDFN¶ZKLFKKHOSHGWRHVFDODWHDPLQRUWUROOLQJLQFLGHQWLQWRDIXOO\-blown 
campaign of online harassment which lasted for five years and spread into offline contexts. 
Indeed, the UK Crown Prosecution Service refused to bring charges to her assailants, as they 
suggested that, against police advice, she actively engaged with trolls and thus there was no 
realistic chance of prosecution (Naked Security 2013). No charges have ever been brought 
against any of her harassers.  
2QHWKHRQHKDQGWKLVFDQEHVHHQDVµEODPLQJWKHYLFWLP¶3HRSOHVKRXOGKDYHDULJKW
to defend themselves and others. However, in offline, embodied contexts, such disputes usually 
dissipate as both parties possess an urdoxic awareness of RQH¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ WR D µVXGGHQ
DGGUHVVIURPHOVHZKHUH¶RUµDGDQJHURXVVXUSULVH¶VKRXOGWKLQJVHVFDODWHBodies encountering 
each other in such circumstances would be guarded by the realisation of a potential escalation 
to a physical altercation. Women, being familiar with their ontological vulnerability to physical 
threat from men, would (for better or worse) likely be more wary of intervention. Men, perhaps 
more aware of the social stigma and recrimination of a physical altercation with a woman in 
public, would likely be more wary of escalation.   
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The Nicola Brookes case demonstrates where things can go when there is no embodied 
vulnerability in an encounter. It demonstrates a misunderstanding of online existence, which 
continually exposes us, not just to a presence tied to the time and place of encounter, but to an 
always-already presence with others in the networked traces of ourselves across multiple 
locations contexts. Thus, Ms Brookes¶ dispute with her antagonisers would not be contained to 
the X-Factor Facebook page, but would follow her online presence across the Web, to her 
family, and eventually to her home address over the course of five years. At the time of her 
first encounter, such a life-changing potentiality would have been difficult to imagine. 
 
Online Mitsein and vulnerability: the Ashley Madison hack 
+HOOR>QDPHUHGDFWHG@\RXGRQ¶WNQRZPHEXW,NQRZ\RXYHU\ZHOO$V\RXOLNHO\NQRZ
the Ashley Madison website was hacked a little while back and in the process some personal 
information from tens of millions of their clients was compromised. As scary as that sounds, 
most of their families will never find out. First, they would have to actively seek out the 
information. Second, the files containing the information are multiple gigabytes in size and 
DUHQRWDOOWKDWFRQYHQLHQWWRDFFHVVLI\RXGRQ¶WNQRZhow. There will be some spammers 
who shoot out mass threatening emails to those on the lists but they can safely be ignored. 
Only the unlucky few will draw the attention of a true blackmailer willing to actually 
UHVHDUFKDWDUJHW¶VIDPLO\DQGDFTXDLQWDQFHV. Unfortunately, [name redacted], you are one 
of the unlucky ones. 
Yes, I know about your secret, that you paid for services from a company that specializes in 
facilitating adultery. But what makes me a threat to you is that I have also spent several 
days getting to know about you, your family and others in your life. All you have to do in 
order to prevent me from using this information against you, [name redacted], is to pay me 
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$2000. And before you ignore this letter consider this: You received this via first class mail. 
It wasn't a spam email some Nigerian sent to thousands of people. That means I spent money 
on it. It means I took extensive counter-forensics measures to ensure the Postal Inspector 
would not be able to track it back to me via post marks or via prints and DNA. It means I 
SDLGFDVKIRUDSULQWHUWKDWFRXOGQµWEHWUDFHGEDFNWRPH,KDYHVSHQWFRQVLGHUDEOHWLPH
and money on you, [name redacted]. So if you decide to ignore me, you can be certain that 
,VXUHDVKHOOZRQµWLJQRUH\RX (Sample blackmail letter from Cluley, 2016). 
Ashley Madison, is dating website which specialises in bringing together married persons who 
are looking for illicit liaisons outside of their marriage or relationship. The premise of its 
business is that it provides a safe, discreet and confidential means for engaging in such activities 
without risking ones relationships, family life and reputation, which is more likely to be the 
case if one attempts such activities among members of their own community or immediate 
social circle.  
On July 12, 2015, employees of Avid Life Media, owners of Ashley Madison Ashley 
Madison turned on their office computers and were greeted by the familiar chords of the 
$&'&VRQJµ7KXQGHUVWUXFN¶DQGDPHVVDJHIURPDKDFNHUJURXSFDOOLQJLWVHOIµ7KH,PSDFW
7HDP¶ 
µWe are the Impact Team. We have taken all systems in your entire office and production 
domains, all customer information databases, source code repositories, financial records, e-
PDLOV«¶ 
It went on to say that if Ashley Madison and partner website Established Men were not shut 
down immediately, the hackers would release to the public all customer records, including 
profiles, sexual preferences and fantasises, chat records, pictures and credit card data (including 
real names and addresses), as well as employee documents and e-mails, causing irreparable 
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harm not only to Avid Life Media, but to the millions of customers (mostly men) who, under 
assurances of discretion and anonymity, had used the site.  
The ethical reasoning behind the attack was twofold. First, the Impact Team took 
offence at the idea that Ashley Madison was engaged in the morally dubious business of 
encouraging extra-marital affairs. Secondly, the Impact Team took issue with the ethically 
reprehensible business practices of the website, for example, in not properly encrypting 
FXVWRPHUV¶GDWDDQGILQDQFLDOWUDQVDFWLRQVDQGDOVRIDOVHO\RIIHULQJDµIXOOGHOHWH¶VHUYLFH
(in which all of their data would be deleted from Ashley Madison databases) to customers which 
was never fulfilled. In addition, the website was actively engaged in grossly exaggerating the 
number of female users on the site by creating IDNHSURILOHVµERWV¶ZKLFKHQFRXUDJHGPHQWR
join and pay for the service under false pretences. In the eyes of the Impact Team, the fraudulent 
behaviour of Avid life Media ZDVDVPRUDOO\SUREOHPDWLFDVWKHLGHDRIDµFKHDWLQJZHEVLWH¶
itself. 
The moral and ethical questions around these events are intriguing and complex, and a 
discussion of these larger questions remains outside the remit of this chapter. What we do know 
is that in mid-August, when Avid Life Media refused to shut down Ashley Madison, the Impact 
Team followed up on their threat and posted large amounts of the leaked data on the µDark 
Web¶. From this point on, those who had data on the site now faced the threats of exposure, 
embarrassment, blackmail, threats to employment and marital breakdown. 
This is exactly what happened. Soon after, search sites sprang up where one could 
simply type in an e-mail address of a partner, friend, neighbour, or work colleague and would 
indicate whether or not that e-mail had been associated with a profile on the site. This did not 
necessarily mean that the person in question had contacted anyone or even actively used the 
site, indeed, since Ashley Madison did not utilise e-mail verification, so anyone could have 
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used any e-mail address to create a profile, but the implication of at least an interest in infidelity 
was there. Famously, one Australian breakfast radio programme provided that service live on 
DLU OHWWLQJ RQH IHPDOH FDOOHU NQRZ WKDW KHU KXVEDQG¶V H-mail had come up on their search 
(Guardian 2015).  
/RFDOEORJVQHZVSDSHUVDQG7ZLWWHUIHHGVSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKH86µGHHSVRXWK¶engaged 
LQµQDPHDQGVKDPH¶FDPSDLJQVSXEOLVKHGWKHQDPHVRIORFDOUHVLGHQWVIRXQGRQWKHGDWDEDVH
sometimes ordering them by postcode so anyone could know who in the vicinity was a potential 
cheater. The damage to reputations and the amount of marriage break-ups resulting from the 
hack goes unmeasured and untold, as does the amount of persecution received by those in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, where adultery and homosexuality are illegal and punishable 
by severe sentences, even death. However, we do know that Toronto police linked two suicides 
with the data leak in Canada (Mansfield-Devine 2015). A police officer in Texas, and a Pastor 
in New Orleans had also taken their own lives as a result (Segall 2015,; Waugh 2015).  
0DQ\RIWKRVHIRUWXQDWHHQRXJKQRWWRKDYHEHHQSXEOLFDOO\µRXWHG¶IDFHGEODFNPDLO
and through the latter months of 2015, dozens of nefarious groups and individuals e-mailed 
extortionate messages to those on the database demanding bitcoin deposits under threat of 
exposure to friends and family (Brown 2015a). Several security websites reported thousands 
of dollars in Bitcoins collected by blackmailers. One website (Meulle 2015/2016) listed eight 
Bitcoin wallets used in blackmail attempts, and a check by this author counted 108.2 Bitcoins 
collected across these eight accounts, equating to roughly $44000 USD6, proving that, at least 
some of the time, crime does pay. Several months later, defying expectations and the 
conventional wisdom that internet blackmailers never make good on their threats, some in 
$PHULFD IROORZHG WKURXJK VHQGLQJ µVQDLOPDLO¶ OHWWHUV WR WKHKRPHDGGUHVVHVDQGZLYHVRI






µI still am looking over my shoulder, and know that it will never go away¶ (Brown 2015b, 
e-mail correspondence with Ashley Madison hacking victim7) 
7KHZRUOGZKHQLWLQFOXGHVWKHRQOLQHWUXO\LVDµZLWK-ZRUOG¶DVRXUVHOYHVDUHalways 
ready-to-hand for others in a kind of continual online Mitsein which continually exposes us to 
others, yet is also the fabric of online being. Such exposures often occur without our 
knowledge, as a lack of embodied urdoxic awareness of such connections obscures the 
exposures and vulnerabilities which are part and parcel of our existence. 
Feminist critiques, such as those encountered earlier in the chapter, demonstrate that 
ZKLOHZHDUHDOOYXOQHUDEOHWRµGDQJHURXVVXUSULVHV¶LWLVZRPHQZKRDUHSDUWLcularly aware 
of the ontological status of vulnerability as a condition of life. 1LFROD%URRNHV¶H[SHULHQFHDs 
a trolling victim demonstrated KRZWKHVHµGDQJHURXVVXUSULVHV¶FDQHPHUJHIURPWKHPRVW
innocuous circumstances. Circumstances that, nonetheless, would have played out in a 
completely different matter had they involved the interaction of material bodies. If Dreyfus 
(2000) suggests that the sense of risk, endemic to embodied life, provides us with a sense of 
WKHµUHDOQHVV¶RIWKHZRUOGDURXQGXVWKe lack of risk perceived in online encounters puts us 
LQDSRVLWLRQZKHUHZHQRWRQO\GLVWDQFHRXUVHOYHVIURPWKHµUHDOLW\¶RIRXUDFWLRQVRQOLQHEXW
ORVHWKHµZDULQHVV¶RIHPERGLHGOLIH7KHSHUFHLYHGODFNRIHPERGLHGYXOQHUDELOLW\LQWKH
interactions of both Nicola and her tormentors allowed a minor dispute to escalate into 
ridiculous proportions, eventually spilling out from the virtual to the material and embodied. 
By contrast, the men on Ashley Madison joined a site advertising discretion and 
confidentiality, providing them the assurance that they could safely engage in activities that 
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were outside the ethical and moral codes of their immediate relationships and communities. 
The presence of their data, perhaps lying dormant for over a decade, would have hardly 
occurred to them outside of their own use of it. They had no reason to expect that their actions 
would make their way into the public realm, connecting them to a world of hacktivists, 
bloggers, news agencies and blackmailers, ultimately returning to their own doorsteps in some 
cases. Many of those who have not been publically exposed still carry the feeling of 
vulnerability and angst epitomised in the quote above. The hack, and the events that followed, 
demonstrated that vulnerability does not just DSSO\ WR WUDGLWLRQDOO\ µYXOQHUDEOH¶ JURXSVEXW
illuminates the wider ontological vulnerability at the core of digital existence itself: the 
openness inherent in a connected world, where selves extend in unforeseen directions, creating 
unanticipated presences which bring contact and exposure with unimagined others.  
The theme of vulnerability not only speaks to the specific instance of men caught using an 
infidelity website, but is something that is endemic to all of us in a contemporary digital culture. 
Ceaseless networking, archiving, and leaks of data mean that we are all connected and thus 
exposed, in a myriad of profiles, accounts, archives, databases and servers, and in a multitude 
of unexpected ways. Ohm (2010) refers to the potential harm caused by the worldwide 
DFFUHWLRQRIGDWDDVDSRWHQWLDOµGDWDEDVHRIUXLQ¶+HVXJJHVWVWKDW 
Almost every person in the developed world can be linked to at least one fact in a computer 
database that an adversary could use for blackmail, discrimination, harassment, financial or 
identity theft (Ohm, 2010, p.: 1748). 
The vulnerability of these online aspects of self become more present at hand to us when we 
hear of, or are the victims of, a data breach, identity theft, extortion, late night phone calls from 
France, or a gang of internet trolls. Incidents such as these illustrate the contradictory stance of 
digital being: of heightened invulnerability in our social encounters with others, alongside a 
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1 &ŽƌtŝůůƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ ?ƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌ ?ďĞŝŶŐĞŶĚƐĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌďĞŝŶŐƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞ
ƉŽŝŶƚǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůĞďĞŝŶŐŚĂƐĐĂƵƐĞƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝƚƐŽǁŶĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ
(Willson 2012:286). 
2 This is, for example, articulated in the heightened awareness of potential threat we might feel in a 
dark alley or walking past a group of overly intoxicated people on a night out. 
3 This allows Bergoffen (2003) for example to challenge cultural and legal assumptions of the body 
 ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ?ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ? ?ĂƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵŽƵƐĂŶĚŝŶǀƵůŶĞƌĂďle as part of a kind of 
fallacious, masculine cultural ideal (Page 2016).  
4 For another discussion of the role of social software in the becoming of oneself and encounter with 
the world, see Langois, chapter seven in this volume. 
 
5 Other articles have varying versions of this statement. 
6 In November 2015 value as depicted by Yahoo UK finance 
(https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/quote/BTCUSD=X?ltr=1). 
7 Located at: http://fusion.net/story/242502/ashley-madison-hack-aftermath/ 
                                                          
